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Thursday, November 14, 2013

Thursday, November 14, 2013
By Colleen Lye and James Vernon (Co-Chairs, Berkeley Faculty Association)


At the end of September, the current 3 year-contract of UAW 2865 representing UC Academic Student Employees (GSIs, readers and tutors) expired and ASEs are now working without a contract. UCOP Labor Relations and UAW 2865 have not yet reached an official “impasse.” But the Berkeley Faculty Association is concerned that UCOP’s last offer of a 2% rise doesn’t come close to eliminating the gap with our comparator institutions, based on a 2010 UCOP survey.  Currently the 10-month (49.5%) GSI stipend is $17,655 for an incoming student, though our campus financial aid office estimates that $21,608 is required to cover the cost of living for 9 months while the campus desired target for doctoral students is $26,000. The Report of the Taskforce on Competitiveness in Academic Graduate Student Support, adopted by UC Academic Council in June 2012, declared “rising tuition and uncompetitive stipends threaten to seriously undermine program quality” and asks that additional resources be allocated for net stipends for academic doctoral support.  On the discussion agenda of the Regents meeting this week, a report from the Committee on Educational Policy restates the situation: “It has become more difficult for UC departments and faculty to offer competitive financial support for their doctoral students.

In letters sent up to UCOP on September 16 and October 3, 33Department Chairs at Berkeley and 21 Chairs at San Diego asked the University to raise the GSI base wage so as to enable our PhD programs to stay competitive, citing the unsustainable practice of having to top up students' support from scarce and unpredictable resources.
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Please lend your voice as a UC faculty member by signing this petition, which will be sent to Director of UCOP Labor Relations Peter Chester.

Posted by Michael Meranze | Comments: 0

Wednesday, November 13, 2013

Wednesday, November 13, 2013
Undergraduate student debt has become a well-publicized national problem, but graduate student debt has ramped up with much less attention. UC began to increase its professional school fees in the last downturn that began over ten years ago, and debt loads for those degrees have increased rapidly.  The thinking was that medical, business, and law degrees endow their possessors with the high incomes that can cover high debt. Whatever one thinks of this logic in those cases, it doesn't apply at all to doctoral students, who experience long degree times, protracted periods of reduced income, and moderately good rather than high incomes afterwards, assuming they avoid many years of postdocs and adjunct teaching.

The materials for the UC Regents' meeting on doctoral education have some good graphics for the University of California version of the problem. The first of these is above.

The percentage of indebted students in each category hasn't increased that much in 10 years. The amount of debt for those who borrowed has increased by 23% in the Physical Sciences, Math, and Engineering (inflation adjusted), and by exactly twice as much in the Arts and Humanities -- by 46%.   Average total debt is 50% higher in the humanities than in the life sciences.

Studies suggest that a college generation graduating into a recession takes decades to catch up economically, if it ever does. The same might be said of humanities PhDs.  Their funding structure graduates them to the rear, and most will never catch up.

The next figure shows the median number of years it takes to finish a doctoral degree at UC and some comparator groups.
The median is nearly six years, or twice that of a law degree.  UC isn't worse than these other research universities, but the Arts and Humanities are worse than other fields.

The higher debt of humanities PhDs probably reflects the extra years required for degree completion.  So why do humanities doctorates take longer and therefore cost degree-holders more?

There are many pieces to this puzzle, but some big ones are easy to name. One is that humanities doctoral students spend several years in postbaccalaureate coursework: coverage happens all over again at the doctoral level before specialization begins.  Books have been written to critique this practice, but given the integrative nature of humanities research--which is not well understood in other fields--not all streamlining will be good.

A second piece is that humanities PhDs teach too much, and are too consistently responsible for the quality of the large lecture experience for undergraduates at research universities.  Most I know work beyond their formal limits, out of conscientiousness, and it's easy to see how one could work 70 hours a week for 5.7 years and still not be finished with a humanities dissertation.

A third piece is that humanities faculty have next-to-no extramural sponsors to provide large grants with which to hire graduate students who can spend those 70 weekly hours doing research related to their PhD, as opposed to spending half of them prepping, teaching, advising, and grading undergraduates. The structure of humanities funding spreads rather than concentrates humanities graduate students' attention.  They become good at understanding and teaching all sorts of things, but this in itself doesn't help them finish their dissertation.

There's much more to say about this, but my main reaction to this report is not only that UC needs to do quite a bit more to improve funding for grads overall (see Display 8), which the Academic Senate has documented in a series of reports over the last 10 years, but that the system can improve humanities PhD graduation time only by increasing research funding for these disciplines.  Hanging onto the status quo won't rectify the inequitable time-and-money hardship of humanities graduate study, which, in spite of our obvious fiscal problems, needs to be fixed.

Posted by Chris Newfield | Comments: 4

Tuesday, November 12, 2013

Tuesday, November 12, 2013
By Catherine Liu, Director, UC Irvine Humanities Collective

In 2008, under the reign of Mark Yudof and in the aftermath of the financial meltdown, the University of California Office of the President overturned the 20 year old “Gardner Initiative” that had supported research and scholarship in the Humanities.  In 1988, David Gardner (15th President of the University of California ,1983-1992) had recognized the centrality of Humanities scholarship to the University and helped establish the Gardner Initiative – a funding scheme that led to the establishment of the University of California Humanities Research Institute and the campus Humanities Centers. UC Irvine won the bid to house the UCHRI. Campus centers received annual disbursements from the Central Administration, amounting to approximately 50K – 100K including graduate student fellowships.  But then, President Yudof decided, the funds for the Gardner initiative would no longer be “automatically” available. We were all to become more “accountable” – there were no longer to be any “entitlements. “ We all had to work together, to find synergies, to emerge bleary eyed from our silos and – collaborate.

The Humanities Deans rallied and worked with UCHRI to apply for funding renewal in 2009.   With these funds, they organized a Consortium and UC Humanities Network. David Marshall, Dean of the Humanities and Fine Arts at UCSB, spearheaded the effort with David Theo Goldberg, Director of UCHRI.  As a result of their efforts, the UC Humanities Network was created in 2009 as a multicampus research group, funded through UCOP's Office of Research--for five years. 

All in all, the Network, which includes UCHRI and the Consortium (the UC Humanities Centers and Institutes spanning the 10 campuses) received $11 million in total funding for this five year period. The Gardner Initiative was, in effect, “replaced” by the Network.   And it is noteworthy that the Consortium and the Network are mysterious entities: there is a web “portal” that alleges their activities, but little real sense of collaboration.

2014 marks the expiration of the funds that have sustained the Centers and the Consortium. In addition, the President’s Faculty Fellowships and graduate student fellowships will also be suspended for 2014-2015.  The recipients were named  a “Society of Fellows,” but as far as I know, other Societies (at Cornell or Princeton) do not struggle for funding from year to year. 

As of today, there is no call for 2014 because of budget cuts to UCOP: in the best case scenario, some Centers might receive local campus “bridge funding” for one year, and a new competition might be announced. Although there has been an “official” announcement of the funding hiatus, each campus has received the news in various ways. 

Is the collapse of funding for the Humanities at the UC the result of thoughtless administration? Is it a conspiracy against the Humanities?  The news as it has emerged has been fragmented at best.  Many faculty are not even aware of the consequences of the postponement of the call. The idea of protest or letter writing was squelched in favor of closed-door negotiations. The results are still negative.

Is Janet Napolitano, new President of the UC, aware of the artificially produced crisis in Humanities funding?
It seems that it has made absolutely no difference whether or not we kept our criticisms of the ways the funds were administered to ourselves, whether we collaborated or not, whether we acted as a “Network” or a new arm of bureaucracy. If we cannot describe our own reality in accurate language, how can we teach our students about textual analysis? Accountability, assessment, evaluation, competition, collaboration, these were the anodyne watchwords that we were supposed to respect without question. 

Even were the Humanities at the UC fully re-funded, a threat will hang over the organization Network/Consortium as it is reconfigured. Some administrators have hinted that we should be “inventing something new.” Indeed the present structures of governance over the Network/Consortium/ UCHRI do not seem to have enhanced ten-campus communication or collaboration. Our EVC of Research John Hemminger at UC Irvine has assured me that the Humanities MRG has the greatest reach into the ten campuses. He is aware of the damage that such a hiatus in the MRPI will have on Faculty, Graduate Students and Research. 

It is almost certain that decisions were made about cuts to research funding that did not specifically target the Humanities. But with limited outside funding, Humanities infrastructure depends for its very existence upon UCOP funds in a way that others do not. 

As the uninformed and ideologically slanted “demise of the Humanities” meme continues to be trumpeted in the news media, and as the ardent defenders of the Humanities read the tea leaves of student enrollments, what is absolutely clear is that at upper levels of higher education administration, the Humanities are not really worth the trouble either to finance or manage well. 

The Gardner Initiative supported the idea that high quality Humanities research must be supported by a large, ambitious public University. In contrast, before he left office, Yudof gave $100,000 to be distributed as part of a Public Humanities Initiative to the ten campuses. The $11 million gap is hardly filled by this one-time Public Humanities grant, but it is always mentioned as a sign of our success in getting the harried and ailing former President’s fleeting attention.

No one seems to care enough about the long-term existence of Humanities research support.  We need to build trust and confidence, but our leaders have no idea to what degree that trust has been undermined. Perhaps they hope that the ethos of professionalism will keep us quiet. 

In this short story, there is the problem of budget cuts and then there is the problem of mismanagement and poor communication.   It is time for both UCHRI and the Humanities Research Consortium to step forward and improve both.
 
Posted by Michael Meranze | Comments: 3

Monday, November 11, 2013

Monday, November 11, 2013
by Joe Kiskis, Department of Physics, UC Davis

The Regents meet this week. There are several items of interest on the agenda.

1) President Napolitano has stated several times that she will announce some big plans. The only likely slot I see for that is between 8:30 and 9:30 am on Wednesday. You probably noticed that she already committed $15 million in non-state funds to the president's postdoc program, grad student recruitment, and undocumented UC students ($5 M for each).

2) A number of capital projects and their financing are on the agenda for the Committee on Grounds and Buildings at 3pm on Tuesday.

State capital projects for the next two years are covered here:

The Capital Financial Plan 2013-2023 has detailed info on plans for each campus. You may find projects that you had no idea your campus was contemplating.

3) Educational policy at 9:30 on Wednesday: there will be a discussion of doctoral education and especially grad student support. The agenda item lays out the problem, but I do not see any definite suggestions other than to meet and discuss the problems some more.

4) Educational policy also has a discussion of annual report on private support. The report itself has a lot of very detailed and sometimes interesting data. E.g. "alumni individuals" gave less than "other individuals." In many categories, the numbers vary sharply by campus. For example faculty giving varies from $17,910 to $4,137,986. At only one campus is it a noticeable slice of the pie, and that is not the campus where it is the largest in absolute terms.

5) The Committee on Finance meeting at 8:50 on Thursday is dense with significant items.  Much of this is seriously wonky stuff and is far more than anyone can digest in one lifetime. However, if you ever need numbers, these are good
places to look.

The budget plan for 2014-15 is here (with attachments here).  This calls for increases in revenue and expenditures of $383.1 million. It's easy to spend it. It's less clear where it will come from, with the only reasonably certain source being $142.2 million more from the state. The University will request an additional $125 million from the state. There is also a "budgeted" increase of $26 million  in Non-Resident Tuition (NRT). The proposal for filling the remaining $90 million gap
comes from projected improvements in investment strategies, procurement contracts, and philanthropic giving. Almost all of the new money will go to increases in salary and benefit costs including a proposed 3% salary increase for all. $50 M is for improvements in academic quality.

6) The annual financial report is here.  The hugely detailed report is here. UC debt has increased to about $15.8 billion, up by about 50% since 2009.

7) UC Retirement System's annual report

8) UCRP report (for the pension system) is here, with attachments here.  The UCRP funded ratio is still falling and is now 76%.

8) Actuarial valuation of the retiree health program is here (with attachments here)

Whew. I'm exhausted just listing all this.
Posted by Chris Newfield | Comments: 2

Thursday, November 7, 2013

Thursday, November 7, 2013
In an effort to have the same health care benefits next year as the rest of the University of California system, UC Santa Barbara faculty groups have maintained pressure on the Office of the President personnel who developed the new plan.  It now appears that UCOP is sending three senior officials to an otherwise routine open enrollment information meeting at the UCSB campus.

The Open Enrollment Fair runs from 9:30 am to 3:00 pm on Thursday, November 7, in Corwin Pavillion.  In the same space, there will be two 90 minute Town Halls at 10:00 am and again at 1:00 pm.

The HR flyer describes these as "your opportunity to hear from UCOP leaders about why changes are being made."  UCSB Faculty Association President Nelson Lichtenstein describes it as your opportunity to hear senior leaders "defending UCOP's decision to offer the UCSB community but an inferior and more costly insurance plan." Scheduled to appear in these roles are Peter J. Taylor, Vice President and Chief Financial Officer; John Stobo, Senior Vice President, Health Sciences and Services; and Nathan Brostrom, Executive vice President, Business Operations.

Both the UCSB FA and the UCSB Senate sponsored petitions objecting to the campus's unequal treatment, and these  collected enough signatures to prompt this highly unusual simultaneous visit of three top officials to the Santa Barbara campus.  Senate Divisional Chair Kum-Kum Bhavnani reportered 853 signatures on her petition prior to submission to UCOP, where her cover letter to Mr. Bostrom et al. concluded, "I know you are aware of the gravity of this issue and it is now evident that the campus faculty and staff are deeply disturbed that the new health plan is not living up to the fundamental principles of access for all and broad coverage."

For those coming in late, the basic issue is that for 2014 UCOP has dropped two Anthem health insurance plans and replaced them with an in-house system called UC Care, in partnership with Blue Shield. But Santa Barbara's only hospital, Cottage, and only large medical clinic, Sansum, are unwilling to offer Tier 1 coverage at the price UCOP has been willing to pay.  Tier 1 means paying a copay rather than 20% for covered medical treatment: the latter is Tier 2, and is available at those facilities, as are the continuing HMO plans.  For additional detail, see our posts "Health Care Troubles and a Simple Solution" (October 9), "The Plot Thickens on UC Care in Santa Barbara" (October 10), "Some Further Questions about UC Care" (October 12), "More on UC Care" (October 15), and links to additional coverage on our Employee Benefits page.  The latter two posts are by faculty from UCLA and UC Berkeley, and UC Care's quality as an employee benefit is a systemwide as well as a UCSB issue.

I objected in "The Plot Thickens" to the UCOP position that by asking for Tier 1 at high-cost Cottage Hospital, UCSB employees were demanding a subsidy from the rest of the system. This is wrong both because UCSB is a net donor to the UC system's budget and because cost mutualization is the purpose of insurance pools and extra costs in this or that group are constitutive.  In their response to Senate Chair Bhavnani and the Senate petition, VPs Bostrom, Stobo, and Taylor stick with their framework.  They maintain that UC Care is a good deal for UCSB employees even without Tier 1. They also say that they will "continue to do all we can to include" Santa Barbara's Tier 1 providers in UC Care, "short of causing a premium increase for all other UC employees." Given the apparent difference between Cottage hospital and UCOP/ Blue Shield, this suggests UCOP remains unwilling to change their cost position to get a deal.

I still think UCOP / Blue Shield can and should come to an agreement with both Cottage and Samsum. There's help from the principle of equal coverage within an insurance pool. There's all the work and good will of campus people who've been trying to fix this for a couple of months.  There's help from a common desire to avoid existential questions about the UC system (does UCOP believe in UC as a whole or doesn't it? is UCSB like some other smaller campuses going to be structurally disadvantaged now and forever? If so, what is the payoff of keeping the system as it is?, etc.) 

Instead of going there, perhaps we could do the math and find a cost point somewhere in the middle. I hope Messieurs Bostrom, Stobo, and Taylor are asked and answer concrete questions about the size of the gap between the parties, the real costs of filling the gap, and whether an immediate patch can be found, before open enrollment closes, while final or out-year negotiations continue.

It seems from Peter Taylor's previous statement that the difference between the UCOP/Blue Shield position and Cottage's is about $825 a month per employee for the employer contribution.  Could UCOP pay $715 more, or $413 more per month more to get UC Care Tier 1 going in its inaugural year and make the equity issue go away? Contributions could be revisited next year and in later years after the system has settled down and everyone has a chance to identify the real costs.

Given the larger questions involved, I don't think that would be so expensive after all.  

Posted by Chris Newfield | Comments: 2

Sunday, October 27, 2013

Sunday, October 27, 2013
The problems besetting Cal athletics keep multiplying.  In addition to the evidence that central campus resources have been used to subsidize Intercollegiate Athletics it has now become clear that the Athletics department has not been fulfilling its responsibilities to its student Athletes in major sports.  A recent NCAA report shows that the graduation rate for Cal Football and Basketball are among the lowest of any University participating in the major sports.  In football, Cal has the lowest graduation rate among the 72 schools listed, while in Basketball Cal has the 4th lowest amongst teams in the major conferences.  These results are occurring at a moment when graduation rates across the country's athletic programs appear to be rising.

Although the Cal Athletics department argued that the figures did not represent present coaching staffs it is hard not to see this as a deep-rooted institutional problem.  Nor can Berkeley insist that its numbers are lower because of the difficulty of its academics.  Stanford on the other hand ranked 5th in graduation rates.

Berkeley has been diverting resources away from the general campus population in favor of their elite athletes. Now it seems, they are failing to meet their obligations to those athletes as well.
Posted by Michael Meranze | Comments: 5

Monday, October 21, 2013

Monday, October 21, 2013
The best recent book about British higher education, Andrew McGettigan's The Great University Gamble,  was the subject of two long reviews last week. I wrote one of them, which appeared in the LA Review of Books under the title “The Counterreformation in Higher Education.”  The other, called “Sold Out,” was written by the eminent essayist and Cambridge literature professor Stefan Collini, and appeared in the London Review of Books.  The essays have US and UK audiences in mind, respectively.  I try to provide enough background on both UK universities and the Conservative government’s changes for non-British readers to see just how huge and irreversible the British changes have been—and how relevant that are to the U.S. If you don’t have time to read the reviews and this post, then stop reading here and cut to the reviews (LARB & LRB). 
 
There are two broad schools of thought in the Anglophone world about the permafrost austerity and the deep cuts that have been applied to public universities. One is that they reflect reform, and that the suffering is temporary, the pain transitional, and the outcome cost-effective improvement.  The other school of thought is that they produce decline, and that both quality and efficiency are being reduced by systemic cuts and related changes.  Drs. Collini, McGettigan and I are declinists, though also optimists in the narrow sense of thinking there is nothing inevitable or necessary about the changes that are harming public universities. 

Thus the work of the book and the reviews is to persuade the first school that changes like the Cameron government’s sudden 80% cuts in the UK university teaching budget are in fact both unnecessary and destructive—that the replacement income of tripled fees and other market-oriented measures create losses rather than gains.  Persuasion will be in the eye of the careful reader, and I hope the McGettigan book attracts quite a few. He shows that Tory talk was one thing and Tory deeds something else altogether. The Great University Gamble will be especially valued by anyone interested in what the broad concept of privatization really means in technical practice.  How you really do that is fully explained in the long-play version, with the nuance required to see the operating system behind Tory beliefs.

The declinists are in turn comprised of various groups.  One might be called the fatalists, who are deeply unhappy about what is happening to their universities but who don’t see intentionality or design, at least ones that could be blocked or redressed. Another are depressives, and this is a psychologically interesting position that I can’t go into here.  A third are anti-commercialists—not anti-commerce in a general sense but anti-commercialism, where commercialism is an ideology that deals with economic adversity, turbulence, injustice, and confusion by saying commercialize everything. 

Prof. Collini and I could be classed as opposing this master narrative, often called neoliberal, and as you read the two reviews you will see a shared sense that behind the assurances of efficient budgets and increased quality lies the goal of commercializing universities all the way down, norming their goals and practices to those of for-profit firms. 

Anyone writing from this position needs to master technical detail for the purpose of constructing arguments that will appeal both to allies and to opponents.  My own method in the LARB review is to use Dr. McGettigan’s formidable research to deduce government motive from government policy implementation, crossing off one declared goal after the other until we get to what is really going on. I also say a few things about why commercialization is bad, since the dominant school sees it as a liberating breeze that brings a vital glow to the excessively cloistered academic cheek. Even commercialization is not, as I see it, the final Conservative goal. But to see how this works you’d have to read through to Sections V and VI of the piece.  

My title alludes to my sense that those who say they favor reform are not rightly called reformers but counterreformers, and that they are not adapting ad hoc to a changing situation but aim at a full counterreformation, which I outline there. The main way today’s conventional wisdom deals with such arguments is to cast them as resistance to inevitable change, but even sympathetic skeptics about the declinist analysis reasonably ask, what do declinists favor? What are declinists for?

Fortunately, Stefan Collini has written an entire book called What Are Universities For? A complex answer lies therein.  One way to think about it in a policy context is as the a strong public good understanding of education. This is an economic discourse that is woefully underdeveloped if not falsified in standard economics. This abstract discourse of the public good—or common, or commonwealth—is embodied in Prof. Collini’s book as the limitless pursuit of human knowledge. 

This discussion emerges in his uncomfortable relationship to the humanism of Cardinal Newman, and I quote him (Prof. Collini) in part.

A better way to characterize the intellectual life of universities may be to say that the drive towards understanding can never accept an arbitrary stopping-point, and critique may always in principle reveal that any currently accepted stopping-point is ultimately arbitrary. Human understanding, when not chained to a particular instrumental task, is restless, always pushing onwards, though not in a single or fixed or entirely knowable direction, and there is no one moment along that journey where we can say in general or in the abstract that the degree of understanding being sought has passed from the useful to the useless. In other words, it is not the subject-matter itself that determines whether something is, at a particular moment, classed as ‘useful’ or ‘useless’. Almost any subject can fall under either description. Rather, it is a question of whether enquiry into that subject is being undertaken under the sign of limitlessness – that is to say, not just, as with the development of all knowledge, subject to the testing of hypotheses or the revision of errors, but where the open-ended quest for understanding has primacy over any application or intermediate outcome.

This is the tip of the iceberg of the impact of the university on public or common knowledge, where the university is one place devoted, in theory, but utterly, to maximizing the power of human thought to save us from ourselves.  Limitless knowledge is a central public stake in the contemporary battles for the university, and the book and these reviews are written in the knowledge that commercialism doesn’t have what it takes to support this work.
Posted by Chris Newfield | Comments: 3

Tuesday, October 15, 2013

Tuesday, October 15, 2013
By Berkeley Anonymous

Previous posts have identified problems with UC Care for employees at non-medical campus and a particular problem with the coverage around UCSB.

But there are broader problems with replacing Anthem’s Blue Cross Plus Program with UC Care. 

Anthem Blue Cross Plus had three tiers including an HMO which I guess most people used most of the time.  But it also allowed flexibility to get out-of-HMO care if needed

UC Care purports to be similar with three ostensibly corresponding tiers 1 - UC Select, 2 - PPO network, and 3 - out-of-network.  But as we heard before, the UC Care Select network excludes many doctors in the Anthem Blue Cross Plus HMO network.  Even the broader UC Care PPO omits some that were part of the PLUS HMO (including one of mine).  Going to Tier3 out-of-network means you’ll probably pay a majority of the cost out of pocket.  UC Care also seems to cover fewer prescriptions; specialty drugs cost some fourfold more.

Perhaps the biggest difference is that one could meet all medical needs using the Anthem Blue Cross Plus HMO -- never needing to pay deductible or co-insurance, even for some out-of-network consultations with specialists and while traveling.  Alternative medicine (acupuncture and chiropractic) were also covered at fixed co-pays without deductible.  Vast swaths of HMO medical expenses were free.  These included: laboratory tests & X-rays not at a hospital, outpatient ambulatory surgery, home health care, medical equipment & devices, hospice care, skilled nursing facilities, home infusion and nurses, emergency physician services, and ambulance.  Free!

UC Care is different.  The UC Care Select tier doesn’t cover most of those free services at all.  Instead, most are bumped to the PPO tier (along with alternative medicine), requiring deductable and co-insurance.   If the type of specialist you need isn’t in UC Care Select, you must go to the PPO tier.  Even some physician services at UC Care Select facilities seem to be billed as co-insurance.  It seems some illnesses will require some PPO tier treatment, with its substantially greater costs.

In short, Anthem Blue Cross Plus mixed low HMO co-pays with out-of-network flexibility when needed.  UC Care is just a PPO with deductibles and co-insurance, except for some Select types of coverage with Select doctors.

* * *
In light of this it is worth looking at the other UC PPO option.  At the bottom of the totem pole in the UC insurance world is the Core plan, the only choice for employees who do not work enough hours to qualify for full or mid-level benefits. However, the costs and benefits of the new UC Care plan make the Core plan look comparatively attractive.
The Core plan has a $0 employee premium.  Though it has a $3000 deductable and co-insurance on drugs, its _maximum_ out-of-pocket cost of $6,350 is not vastly higher than -- or even lower than -- the employee family premium alone for the UC Care program ($4,392 in IncomeBandII, $6,917 in IncomeBandIV -- though bear in mind that premiums are pre-tax).  Its out-of-network benefits look better than UC Care.

So, the Core plan could be the most cost-effective plan for many families, considering premium plus out-of-pocket costs.

CORRECTION:  http://atyourservice.ucop.edu/oe/medical/core.html says “Annual out-of-pocket maximums ($6,350 per member) limit what you pay.”   In my original post I assumed “member” meant employee or family.  However, it turns out that “member” means “family member;” i.e., the out of pocket is $6,350 per person, and for a family the maximum is $12,700.  This is listed in the new detailed plan description, at https://www.blueshieldca.com/sites/uc/documents/2014-OE-Brochure-Non-Medicare.pdf (page 12).   Given this, it turns our that Core will not be as appealing as I previously suggested.

UPDATE: Also, there is a confusing statement at http://atyourservice.ucop.edu/oe/tools-resources/discontinued-plans/anthem-plus-plan.html which says:

"If you do nothing
 You will be enrolled in the new UC Care plan, with the same dependent coverage you have now. UC Care has the same in-network and out-of-network coverage you have now, with much more."

This statement on the UCOP website is only true if "with much more" is interpreted to mean "with more out-of-pocket expense, for deductible and co-insurance charges."


Posted by Michael Meranze | Comments: 9

Saturday, October 12, 2013

Saturday, October 12, 2013
In his two posts (here and here) Chris has raised a series of issues concerning the failure of UCOP to ensure that all campuses have access to Tier 1 coverage in UC Care.  Although his focus has been on the Santa Barbara case, there are indications from other non-medical school campuses that there are tremendous concerns over access and costs.  But the issues do not stop there.  I want to raise here a few issues concerning the impact of the health insurance changes even at the Medical Center campuses and then raise some questions which it seems to me is incumbent on UCOP to answer--and to answer with real data and reasons.

I should say that my first thought on the changes was that it would make little difference to those on Medical Center campuses.  But as I looked into the issues a little more I began to doubt that.  Given that we have not yet had a full accounting of the details of the new plan these concerns are somewhat tentative.  But I think faculty and staff need to look into this issue with some care--and not just with UCcare.

Just so we are all on the same page I am basing this discussion on three documents available at UCOP.  They are descriptions of the benefits for Anthem Blue Cross Plus, Anthem Blue Cross PPO, and the new UC Care.  If I am reading these documents correctly (and I am happy to have others correct any errors) then the following is the case.

If you have the Anthem Blue Cross Plus AND you are already in a UC Medical group your changes will be relatively small.  In fact, if you are able to select a Tier 1 physician your co-pays will drop slightly, and your yearly co-pay max is the same.  That is true with specialists as well so long as they are at a UC medical center (I am assuming that the sort of intervention that occurred at UCSC to obtain a non-UC Tier 1 provider is off the table since that would defeat the whole purpose of the shift).  Your fees for physician services in emergency rooms apparently will go up although not the hospital fees. (compare pg,5 with pg.2)  It is less clear to me about the costs and availability of medications since I have not located those lists.  Nor is it clear whether or not the shift to an HMO type plan for Tier 1 will affect the pressures on doctors in terms of referrals or procedures.

But if you were in Anthem Blue Cross Plus and you ARE NOT already in a UC Medical group then things look quite different.  For one thing, it isn't clear that there are enough spaces at the Medical Centers to accommodate people shifting in.  And second if you wish to keep your non UC doctor they will now be in Tier 2 (even if they had been considered "in network" for the purposes of Anthem Blue Cross Plus).  Vice-President Duckett indicated that there would be a high overlap in doctors between the old system and the new.  But the only way that I can figure out for that to be true is if he means that doctors who were formerly "in-network" (the de facto equivalent of UC Care's Tier 1) will now be available in TIER 2.  In THAT case employees co-pay and costs will go up considerably.

If on the other hand, you were in the Anthem Blue Cross PPO, your Tier 1 or Tier 2 costs and access should not be strongly affected.  On the other hand, your costs outside of the network will go up for any specific event although your yearly maximum contributions will go down somewhat.

To sum up, despite the focus that UCOP has placed on premiums if you are at one of the medical center campuses it is looks pretty clear that access AND cost will not be maintained for those in the discontinued plans unless you are able to move into a UC medical center for your health care.

If this is the situation I think that it raises a series of questions:

1) Vice-President Duckett reportedly indicated that this transformation was instigated by the Medical Centers themselves.  It would be good to have a fuller accounting of this process.  I understand that UC might be interested in being able to retain its revenues within itself rather than having to release them to the outside.  But in this case, it seems as if the interests of the majority of faculty and staff are being subordinated (in some cases sacrificed) to the interests of the medical centers.  Vice Presidents Taylor and Brostrom have claimed that the University will secure important savings from these changes.  If that is the case how are those savings going to spent?  If UC faculty and staff are going to be pushed into the medical centers where is that revenue going to?  For what? Taylor and Brostrom speak as if these changes benefit everyone.  But how exactly?

2) Given this first set of questions I think it is fair to ask about the general relationship between the medical centers and the campuses.  I should make clear that I think that medical education is an important part of the UC system.  And I know that there are important synergies between the medical faculty and the campus faculty at least at UCLA.  But we know from its own statements that UCSF is facing a difficult future, no one seems to know about the financial future of the medical centers after ACA, and as Dan Mitchell has tirelessly pointed out in his analyses of the sometime-in-the-future-who-knows-when hotel convention center at UCLA the medical centers can have enormous effects on UC's spending priorities. 

3) There is also a question of the timing of all of this.  I recognize that this actually took a while to develop.  But in the event we have learned that the new system could not complete a successful negotiation for the faculty at UCSB and only did so through outside intervention at UCSC.  Berkeley people are complaining about the effects.  And I am not sure what is going on with either Riverside or Merced.   Why exactly UCOP was willing to do this when there was so much uncertainty for so many campuses is a fundamental question.

I remain proverbially naive about the Academic Senate.  But from my vantage point it seems to me that the least the Academic Council can do is insist on answers to these questions and plans for the rectification of the obvious problems.  This issue is a large one for Faculty Welfare after all. 

Of course UCOP makes the decisions here.  Vice-President Taylor is constantly insisting that UCOP is incredibly transparent.  This would be a fine issue to provide some evidence of that claim. 

UPDATE: In conversation with different faculty it appears that there may be some non-UC doctors who will fall into Tier 1 status.  As a result I would urge people to check carefully the status of their various doctors.  We are hoping to be able to provide more information and analysis as time goes on.  And feel free to use the comment sections if there are clarifications that you can provide.

Posted by Michael Meranze | Comments: 0

Thursday, October 10, 2013

Thursday, October 10, 2013
The Chronicle of Higher Education has now run Don Troop's story on the UC health care changes, "Changes in U. of California's Medical Plans Worry Some Employees."  The piece reports information from UCOP finance head Peter Taylor that may be new to most people--it was to me at least. 

Mr. Taylor is quoted as saying that offering UCSB employees the same plan (UC Care Tier 1) "'would raise individual premiums systemwide by $323 a year. That's asking 18,400 non-UC-Santa Barbara employees to pay out of pocket tremendously so that about 600 Santa Barbara employees would have access to this,' he said. 'We're trying to find a balance. We don't have an inexhaustible supply of money, and yet we want to provide a solid benefit to our faculty and staff.'"

Does this mean that Cottage Health Systems wanted $5.94 million more than UC and Blue Shield were willing to pay? This comes to about $10,000 extra per affected employee.  Does it mean that actuaries expect that each of the 600 UCSB employees will need an extra $10,000 a year apiece to cover the difference between the Tier 1 care available apparently everywhere except at the Santa Barbara campus and the Tier 2 that they will have?  I will ask.

We do seem now to have a quantification of the gap between Cottage and the University.  We also have a somewhat different tone regarding the Santa Barbara campus.

Mr. Taylor's comments seem to recast UCSB employees, who defined themselves as seekers of a cross-campus equity of which they have been deprived, as demanders of subsidies from their UC colleagues elsewhere.  I pointed out in the post that cross-campus equity is not a subsidy, since UC Care is being underwritten by UC medical facilities and personnel in ways that are complex in accounting terms, and because UC has "subsidized" other non-medical campuses in providing them with local Tier 1 facilities.  Any framing of UCSB as seeking special privileges is inaccurate. 

This framing also misstates the nature of insurance pools, which are all about the mutualization of common costs.  This was a driving principle behind the Affordable Care Act, which outlaws the exclusion of people on the basis of a "preexisting condition."  Insurance providers are now not allowed to throw less healthy people out of health care pools because they've identified them as having higher individual costs.  Similarly, UC shouldn't throw a campus out of UC Care Tier 1 because their local health facility has higher costs.  

The framing in which UCSB is seeking a subsidy is also at odds with UC budgetary history: UCOP distributes to UCSB  lower funding per student than it gives to any other UC campus (see the Rebenching report, Appendix A for a table and Appendix B for a bar graph).  We've commented on campus inequities in this space before.  To state the matter somewhat pointedly, UCSB is a long-term net subsidizer of the UC system as a whole.  Let's posit that this UCSB contribution to the UC system is a good thing in the "all for one and one for all" spirit of UC as One University.  This spirit leads directly to UCOP negotiating correct UC Tier 1 coverage at UCSB.

I hope that Mr. Taylor and Mr. Duckett redouble their efforts to fix this inequity.
Posted by Chris Newfield | Comments: 7

Wednesday, October 9, 2013

Wednesday, October 9, 2013
UPDATED BELOW
In the spring of 2011, my partner Avery, a semi-pro cook, was working in the kitchen of our house in Santa Barbara when she cut straight through an artichoke and into her hand, severing tendons and sending blood everywhere. I was still working in France, so she called 911 and the fire department came. They took a look and called an ambulance, which drove her from the house on the Eastside to Cottage Hospital, an 11-minute drive of 3.3 miles in length, for which she was later billed $1900.

At the hospital, the first question was, “Do you have insurance? The second question was, “what kind of insurance do you have?” Avery had Anthem PPO and presented the card with the hand that wasn't oozing blood. She was waved through to immediate treatment, and one night, one surgery, and many doctor and hand therapy visits later she was on the mend. The care was good and the out of pocket cost ended up being about $2000, for some reason under the $3000 annual (in-network) cap including $410 as her share of 11 minutes in the ambulance.

That is a very happy ending under American health care. Will this be possible under the new health insurance regime, as UC’s Office of the President replaces Anthem with UC Care?

The switch is causing an uproar at UC Santa Barbara, and major concern at several other UC campuses. The UCSB problem is that it won’t have the Tier 1 benefits that other campuses get, and some subset of employees will pay more out of pocket than their colleagues at other campuses.

At a well-attended town hall on campus last week (partial audio here), there was plenty of concern about interrupted health care, reduced care, costs getting shifted onto employees—and also an undertone of worry that as a perennial “younger campus” UCSB was being relegated to second-tier status. “The breaking up of the UC system continues,” one person suggested to me in an email. There’s also the steady erosion of “total compensation” for UC employees. Salaries have been below the comparison average for years. Recently, pension and benefits are going to the same place. One effect of UCOP’s recent financial strategy has been the end of UC’s comparative advantage for employees.

But first, the answer to the care question is yes it will be the same—if you’re willing to pay more. Under Anthem, when you cut your hand open, and regardless of your doctor’s status in Anthem’s network you paid 20% of ER costs, 20% of emergency transportation, and 40% of surgical and other fees—if performed by a non-network doctor. But once one’s insurance was identified, an in-network surgeon seems to have been procured, and hence the semi-manageable out-of-pocket costs described above.

UC Care will be different: an outline is here. There is more detail here (now Scribd here), where it’s easier to compare its 3 tiers. (October 9th replacement of that link is here.) If you are my blog partner, UCLA professor Michael Meranze, and you cut your hand open in your kitchen in Santa Monica, an ambulance takes you to UCLA Medical Center, you pay $100 for ER costs, 20% of physician costs, and $100 for the outpatient surgery. That is Tier 1 UC Care, and it is available at all UC Medical Centers and other designated hospitals. Cottage in Santa Barbara is not one of these.

So if next year I cut my hand open in my kitchen in Santa Barbara, I will pay 20% of the full cost of all of the above. That is under Tier 2 of UC Care, which is Blue Shield’s Preferred network. UC Vice President for Human Resources Dwaine Duckett assured employees at the UCSB town hall that Cottage and Samsum Clinic would both be available for UC Care Tier 2 patients. And they are still available to HealthNet patients as well under HMO referral conditions.

But why would Cottage look at my UC Care card and treat me as Tier 2? I don’t know for sure, but I assume that they would want to know if my regular doctor is actually part of the Blue Shield network. And the answer to this question would be no. In that case, I will be treated as a non-network person attached to “non-preferred providers,” in other words, as a patient from Tier 3. Then I will be paying 50% of all costs (except ambulance and ER at 20%) up to an annual cap of $5000 (for individuals, or $15,000 for families).

There’s also reason to think my case is typical rather than anomalous. First of all, people want to keep their doctors, and the right to do this has become a national political issue in the Age of Obamacare. The UCSB town hall heard harrowing testimony—one faculty member reported that two of his wife’s three surgeries for brain cancer would happen at Cottage, and then the third, which fell after January 1, was supposed to be with another surgeon at a different hospital 50 miles from where they lived? It’s not clear whether there are continuity provisions.

And second, Tier 2 consists of the Blue Shield Preferred network, which has to have doctors in it for you to see if you want to belong to Tier 2. I assume that being Tier 2 at Cottage would require that your doctor be Blue Shield and have admitting privileges. There are parts of California that have great Blue Shield networks. For example, a search for Blue Shield network providers in any specialty within 15 miles of 94301, Palo Alto’s zip code, yields 983 doctors. The same search for Blue Shield’s Santa Barbara network (any specialty within 15 miles of zip codes 93101 or 93110) yields 20 doctors. And 8 of them are pathologists.

The UCSB UC Care situation seems to be this. UC Care has a lower monthly premium than Anthem did, but higher copays and caps for the non-network people who are the ones mostly likely to seek a PPO in the first place. Then, at UCSB there is no Tier 1, so the low-cost high quality option is not available at all in the area. UCSB does have Tier 2 access to the local hospital, but Tier 2 Santa Barbara—the Blue Shield preferred network-- barely exists. Tier 2 may wind up being Tier 3 for most SB UC Care people for most conditions, unless they can gear up for a 40-100 mile ambulance ride. The cross-campus inequities are obvious: what most campuses can get for $20 copays (or $100 per outpatient surgery) will push UCSB employees up towards their $5000 / $15000 annual caps.

How did Santa Barbara fall through the PPO cracks (along with, at least initially, Berkeley, Merced, and Santa Cruz)? UC Care was based on a UC med center tie in--Mr. Duckett said the medical centers came to UCOP wanting to bid for the UC employee health business—which put the non-medical campus at a disadvantage.

He also said that in the Santa Barbara case there wasn’t a failed negotiation between UC and Cottage, but between Cottage and Blue Shield. Blue Shield made bids, and Cottage “made the decision that we don’t feel as though we should be offering these types of discounts.” Cottage does have a health care monopoly in town, and seems to be holding out for more money—even if it risks losing much of Santa Barbara County’s biggest payroll to providers outside the area.

Mr. Duckett said his office would continue to lean on Cottage and Blue Shield, and that in the meantime UCSB folks should write letters to “anyone who will listen.” This strikes me as shifting responsibility onto people who didn’t create the problem and who have no power to fix it. UCOP is putting together an insurance network, and it needs to function normally across all the cities where its employees live. UCOP obviously needs to finish putting its network together.

In the meantime, there’s a simple way to restore cross-campus equity. UCOP could reimburse all UCSB UC Care patients for the difference between (a) what they are paying for the tier they are forced to use (Tier 2 at best, mostly likely Tier 3), and (b) what they would be paying if they had a local version of Tier 1.

For example, if the hand wound needs $55,000 of reconstructive surgery, the would-be Tier 1 patient would pay $1500 to UC Care, and UC would pay $3500 to UC Care to make up the $5000 of the UC Care charge to the patient, who at UCSB has to be in Tier 3. UC would make a similar payment to match the difference between a $100 outpatient surgery and the 50% of $55,000 which a UC Care Tier 3 patient would be obliged to pay.

This may seem at first like a subsidy to UCSB employees that other campuses don’t get. But in reality medical campus employees are already getting an equivalent to this subsidy from the university. And this arrangement would be temporary, while UCOP restores cross-campus equity.

On the other hand, if UCOP does no more than encourage Cottage and Blue Shield to settle, it puts UCSB at a recruitment and retention disadvantage in relation to other UC campuses, which weakens a UC system that is already struggling to keep up with its peers in other places.

UPDATE: Michael has found a 7 page list of UC Care TIer 2 providers (Blue Shield's Preferred network) in Santa Barbara, which I've posted here.  So please take my gloom about Tier 2 with a grain of salt. The UCOP patch would apply to a solid Tier 2 as well as to Tier 3.
Posted by Chris Newfield | Comments: 12

Friday, October 4, 2013

Friday, October 4, 2013
The Chronicle of Higher Education ran a section this week called NEXT: The Future of Higher Education. Last year the future was Massive Open Online Courses. This year the future is something else. The shift can be visualized in this graphic, accompanying a piece by CHE Editor-at-large Jeffrey Selingo on a recent poll of professors and college presidents.

The orange bars represent faculty opinion, and the blue, that of the college presidents.  The opinion of both groups is now overwhelmingly negative towards MOOCs--at least as a mode of college education, and MOOCs will carry on and improve in the wider world. A solid majority of college presidents agree with 2/3rds of faculty that MOOCs are a negative force in higher ed, which is not something that I for one would have predicted even six months ago.

On the other hand, hybrid courses do well with both groups, particularly the presidents.  Adaptive and interactive learning technologies do pretty well too.  At a minimum, this poll suggests that nine of ten faculty feel that adaptive and interactive technologies in a hybrid environment will do no harm.  It shows fairly strong levels of faculty interest in learning innovation.  The 2012 MOOC wave had the virtue of getting instruction back on the agenda of many faculty, in large part by making teaching seem more like a site of research, where new discoveries occur and improvements are put in place. This poll confirms the momentum behind better learning. The first thing we can say about this year's CHE future is that it's focused on student learning.

Mr. Selingo identifies a further condition that would help make learning innovation more sustainable. Noting that large majorities of both faculty and presidents would like to see more change rather than less, he writes,
When it comes to driving change in higher education, faculty members overwhelmingly believe that while they should be leading the discussion, politicians were often the ones pushing the agenda. Somewhat surprisingly, presidents also said faculty members should be driving change, and agreed that it's often politicians who control the conversation.
The issues that politicians have driven are preserving access and cutting costs.  This is really one issue: what they want is the same or better access to equal quality at a lower per-student cost.  State politicians have no intention of reversing long-term cuts that left 2012’s (inflation adjusted) per-student appropriations at 70% of what they were in 1987 (Figure 3).   Many know that 1987-level state funding was what enabled the mass access to high quality that built the powerhouse knowledge economy they want to revive.  But they nonetheless can't or won't get to 2007-level public investment, to say nothing of the much higher 1987-levels.  They saw MOOCs as a way getting the quality without the investment.  What we might call the Koller Hypothesis, after the co-founder of Coursera Daphne Koller, was that MOOCs could achieve “a cost of effectively zero dollars marginal cost per student” (“Rebooting Higher Education,” p 3). In our transcript of this event, you can read Udacity’s Sebastian Thrun politely disputing Prof. Koller’s zero-cost hypothesis (p 29), but the idea that online technology could more than make up for all funding declines was firmly embedded in the political consensus--as MOOC business strategy required it to be.

In other words, when universities lose MOOCs as a budget solution, they lose the main source of hope that state politicians had for a free fix of the college cost problem for a less affluent, not wonderfully educated younger generation.  MOOCs were the austerity solution to the mass quality problem.  Without them, tempers will flare, fingers will point, and funding will not be restored. In the meantime, faculty are going to have to lead higher ed innovation anyway, and the good news is that post-MOOC-as-cure-all faculty don't need to focus on the technology to the exclusion of the “human side” of teaching and learning.

The Chronicle’s Next collection has fourteen essays on the subject, and I don't number among the most helpful the one co-authored by innovation guru Clayton Christensen.  His piece focuses on radical cost cutting through goal simplification, while the better pieces, in my view, focus on goal enhancement, which is student development.

But first we need to look at the Christensen innovation baseline. His key insight, in his classic books, The Innovator’s Dilemma (1997) and The Innovator’s Solution (2003), was that in contemporary capitalism truly “disruptive” innovation comes in the form of worse technology adapted to less sophisticated non-consumers. One of his early examples was Canon wrecking Xerox with its pokey, mediocre, home office copiers, which discovered a new market of people who couldn't use or couldn't afford a real Xerox machine.

The analogy with higher ed is obvious--every college charging $20,000-$50,000 a year is ripe to be picked off by innovative disrupters, except for the Harvard, Swarthmore, and Stanford-style premium brands.  Christensen's cure is always for the incumbent--especially in the middle tiers--to focus on “a critical job to be done” and stick to that. In The Innovative University (2011), the two viable types of college are Harvard and BYU-Idaho: the latter revived itself with a 4-season all-teaching faculty that created shorter, straighter lines to cheaper BA qualifications by dumping peripherals like sports teams, and ending traditional working conditions and teaching schedules to focus on modularized, highly sequenced programs in which all effort and investment is focused on highly programmed goals.

This is a perfectly fine kind of college to have, but it is cheap because teaching-only undergraduate programs with limited courses (and lower-middle intellectual goals) are indeed cheap. As many have pointed out, college doesn't cost so much because standard teaching costs so much: the costs are mostly elsewhere, and only some of them are unjustified in relation to the “critical job.” In reality, the university’s critical job is usually comprised of a complex bundle of jobs, all of which cost money.

If you define your “critical job to be done” as “creativity learning,” as I do for knowledge economies in general, and also as “public good research,” as public research universities must, then the cost savings of radical simplification are simply not available.  “Understanding” is a complex activity that requires a variety of inputs, and what we don’t want is even more stratification than we already have in which only expensive, selective, elite universities are allowed to teach complex thinking with the full range of needed practical implementations, while the children of the ex-middle class are given the mechanisms of lesser capabilities.

Higher ed needs a plurality of innovation modes—Harvard and BYU-Idaho and BYU-Provo and Michigan-Ann Arbor and Michigan Tech, etc., but not where plurality  means two or ten grades of cognitive skills. It also needs honesty about costs—doing research and intensive teaching with many small courses or “flipped classrooms” drive costs up--so that we don’t spend half our time defensively explaining why UNC-Chapel Hill will always cost more than Western Governor’s University.

Prof. Christensen’s theory has been used to say that the 99% need always to scramble downmarket.  In fact, their institutions need differentiation and universal upgrading.  Let’s just say that he and his co-author try to call a truce around disruption, and look at the other articles without trying to force them into the mold of adapting to low-cost disruptors.

When we do, what do we find? Descriptions of all sorts of interesting programs that are student-centered in the best sense, while connecting university work to learning structures in the rest of the world.   The key premise appears in a piece on remaking career centers: a center at Franklin & Marshall College
has moved from the old-fashioned "transactional" model—which focused on helping students complete specific tasks, like writing a rĂ©sumĂ©—to a developmental model that works with students over time.
Learning is at bottom human development.  It is the most immediately transformative thing that universities (and their partners) can do. One example is the Olin College of Engineering, which offers a curriculum that is historically oriented, project-based, user-focused, and entirely personal.
Before they arrived at the workshop, participants interviewed students from their home campuses to create composite "personas," which described how different types of students approach their education, what they want from it, and where they encounter difficulty. That exercise was an example of how user-centered design could be applied to curriculum planning.
Two possibly-unacknowledged insights of ethnic and feminist studies-- the importance of experience and standpoint-- seem here to have joined with practice-based theories of technological innovation to create an undergraduate curriculum that is not behind, below, and apart from research, but is research itself.  Learning is research as research-learning. The practice of it makes it clear that it can and should be available to students regardless of the price and selectivity of the particular college.

Most of the articles have moments like this: the University of Delaware creating “preceptors” to mediate between lecture and lab and to help individual students create their own intellectual trajectories.  There are the “guide on the side” reversals of questions and answers at Southwestern University, the “start-ups for all” program at RIT that aims to help students author and “self-publish” their career trajectories, and even the rolling chairs that help make Michigan state classroom groups more flexible so that, as part of a complex chain of interactions, students will have better capabilities for “communication and teamwork and problem solving in areas they haven't seen before.”

Only two questions nagged me as I read these testimonials of all the interesting things all sorts of universities have put in place. First, basic research is nearly invisible.  How does that fit in at universities where it is a major focus?
Secondly, all these real innovations cost money. In public universities, our funders wanted free ones.  How will we talk them into the kind that the public will need to pay for?
Posted by Chris Newfield | Comments: 15

Wednesday, October 2, 2013

Wednesday, October 2, 2013
As you know, the House Republican Leadership has decided to shut down the Federal Government in protest of losing the last Presidential election.  The effects on Higher Education and Research are already appearing.  Some scientific labs have been forced to either close or restrict operations.  NASA has curtailed its activities.  If the closure is short, the larger effects may be minimal.  But if it goes on who knows...

Two younger faculty reflect on the potential impact and significance:

Anonymous A:

Let's talk fucking privilege: A very small minority can do their jobs very fucking poorly, put millions of people, including elderly folks and veterans, at real risk, and not have to give up one dime of their own fucking salary or one ounce of their own fucking comfort, just because they're mad that they're not getting their way?!! Yet, if I and about 30 of my colleagues just stopped doing our fucking jobs and endangered our student constituencies with that stoppage, we'd be out of a job so quickly our fucking heads would be spinning for days. This outrage and status are brought to you by the letter "F" for fuck!!!

Anonymous B: 

I was an undergrad the last time the government shutdown. Under Newt's directive, it was shutdown for 21 days. I was an emancipated minor. I remember being terrified of the implications. I was already trying to pick up extra shifts, along with everyone else I knew, and trying to endgame workarounds to keep me enrolled at CSUF. I showed up the financial aid office early in the morning--6am (like poor people do, go ask a poor person why)--and they said just show up to classes. So that's what we did. At the time, we were either 58% or 68% first generation college students. I honestly can't remember. It rivals the affirmative action for rich people and legacies at elite colleges (though it's never really called affirmative action, is it?) I digress. I remember that as students we didn't know if our profs would show up. Why would they? They're not getting paid and they'll probably not get paid retroactively. We never did, and our people never did when they went on strike. Only it wasn't a strike. But that's where we were wrong. Capital was on strike. Not the workers. Our profs showed up. They taught. And for over two months or thereabouts (when a gov't shuts down, it takes more than an open sign to get it working) all fees and tuition collections were suspended. And they taught. I'm a professor now. I'm at a public school dependent on federal funds. I'll teach for as long as it takes for people to demand some sense. And when I give my diversity week talk on Wednesday, I'm giving it on public education and its vital importance to the democratic project, because where in the hell do you think this kind of jackassery is going to be felt the most? Those that already have the buffer and connections won't feel a thing. Even without the gov't shutdown I'm using the VERY little threat power (and let's be clear, by "threat" I mean "shame") I have to make sure veterans get their tuition paid and their seats secured in classes. Can you imagine if it lasts 21 days? I'm in the state with the third highest rate of unemployment and winter is here. This isn't CA where you can live on shit you steal from CSUF's arboretum (you think CSUF doesn't know this happens? They planted MORE farm/fruit crops because of this). Food doesn't just happen here. Neither does heat.

 Let us know if the Shutdown affects your work.




 


Posted by Michael Meranze | Comments: 0

Tuesday, September 17, 2013

Tuesday, September 17, 2013
As we all prepare for the Napolitano era, the Regents are heading to their favorite meeting place at UCSF (safe from undergraduates) with time to stop off at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.   There are any number of items to be discussed but first and foremost is the question of the UC budget.  There the crucial meeting is Wednesday's Finance Committee Session.  Among other items, the Finance Committee is to hear about the long-range budget plan, the expected 2014-2015 budget, and the wondrous accomplishments of the "working smarter initiative."  Although we won't know in detail what UCOP is proposing until they actually make their presentations, it is possible to see the general strategies and narratives that UCOP is proposing for budgetary planning and decision-making.

As ever, UCOP appears not to know what it wants to say; as a result it continues to alternate in what it is asking of the State and from the University community.  But appearances can be deceiving.

If you turn the budget presentations into a narrative it would go something like the following: 

After long years of budgetary cuts, Governor Brown has, through his handling of the state's debt, his success in achieving passage of proposition 30, and his willingness to commit to a series of funding increases over the next several years succeeded in staunching the bleeding of budget cuts.  In the new state budget UC's general fund increases total $256M in unrestricted funds although $125M of those go for a tuition buy-out.  In this way, the state is now in the words of OP: "signify the welcome, necessary return of the State to being a true partner with UC." (3) BUT this "true partnership" is, notable for its stability more than its adequacy.  Indeed, at the heart of OP's narrative is the argument that although the State has agreed to helpful increases in funding it is also preventing the University from functioning properly by restricting its ability to raise tuition.

Put another way, the real message behind OP's budget narrative is that UC must increase tuition if it is to continue to function as a leading research University and the Regents, the public, and the State must accept this claim.

The headlines that OP seems to want to emerge from the meeting is that although State funding has increased, it has not increased sufficiently to cover required increases in expenditures so that long-standing problems cannot be addressed.   Again in OP's language:

The State funds provided in 2013-14 ($256.4 million) are a welcome departure from past years’ base budget cuts. However, they are sufficient to fund only the cost increases on the State-funded portion of the budget – which is now less than half of the total core funds.  (2)


Thankfully, the OP has stopped insulting the State every time it seeks funding.  But we must be clear that OP is presenting a scenario in which the state must choose between rising tuition and decreasing quality.

There are several preliminary things to be said about these claims.

First, it is clear that the state funding does remain insufficient.  The increases in State funding do not recover from the years of cuts and leave numerous buildings in need of maintenance, faculty positions unfilled, staff positions cuts etc.  But the University has accepted the state funding end of the equation as satisfactory.  It is the tuition side that they are pushing--not more public investment.  We appear to be entering a period where OP has de facto accepted an updated version of the earlier compact with Arnold.  And we know how well that turned out.

Second, it is not clear that OP's numbers add up.  In its discussion of the 2013-2014 budget OP makes their case for the necessity of tuition increases by insisting that the increase in state funding only covers the cost of increases to the core budget.  According to OP the necessary increase comes to $155M (or more than is left over after the tuition buyout).  But OP is also touting the fact that they will save $80M because of a shift in debt accounting (2) and Executive Vice-Presidents Brostrom and Taylor are claiming that they have created $171M worth of funds this year due to "working smarter." (1)  If these claims of financial and administrative wizardry are accurate then that should leave roughly $100M in funds for UC (or nearly as much as the administration had hoped to get from tuition increases and without the reduction of "return to aid").  So either their claims about the necessity of tuition increases appear overstated or the claims about the wondrous savings are overstated.

Third, if you read the documents I linked at the top (and I urge you to do so) you will see that OP has set off a set of oppositions between "truly mandatory" and "high priority" costs. (2)  Strikingly, the "truly mandatory" costs focus largely on benefits for faculty, staff, and retirees.  The "high priority" costs on the other hand tend to focus on delayed maintenance and steps taken to ensure increased quality in education.  Now, I am happy to see that OP takes the declining benefit situation seriously and also agree that with their insistence that the State commit to its responsibility for UCRP.  But the way that they have set the argument up places employee benefits and salaries and tuition increases in a paired relationship.  Put bluntly, OP appears to be constructing a narrative in which faculty and staff compensation (in all of its forms) is the driver behind increases in tuition.

There are subsidiary lines about alternative sources of revenue--mostly in terms of out of state and especially international students.  But the main thrust appears to be Tuition Hikes Ahoy or say goodbye to quality. 


Posted by Michael Meranze | Comments: 2

Wednesday, September 11, 2013

Wednesday, September 11, 2013
It is true that in the U.S.  “the tuition is too damn high,” and there’s enough righteous public anger about it for the Washington Post to have published a ten-part back-to-school Wonkblog series under that very title.  Why is tuition so high, according to this major metropolitan newspaper? The answers are of real interest: Even the best points made by the series author Dylan Matthews, in his heroic effort to create a coherent big picture, reinforce the premise behind the current perversity in state and national policy.  


For starters, Mr. Matthews agrees that college is still worth it.  B.A. degrees garner on average twice the lifetime earnings of high school diplomas.  College tuition offers an estimated 15-17% return on investment, which is better than your mama’s bond yields or the appreciation on an apartment near the Google bus.   (Parts I, II)  The other side of this is that dodging college now actively damages your economic future.  Colleges have something of a captive market, and this is where the trouble starts.

Although the customers keep lining up for the college product, they know a lot more about cars, apps, and clothes than they do about college.  Applicants have no "first-hand knowledge of colleges' quality," so a bunch of quality “signals” are gathered together to dubious effect. (VI) Brand plays a major role (Smith, Stanford, Swarthmore, Slippery Rock, and so on).  So do image, region, peer opinions, relentless marketing, and gimmicky, indecipherable financial aid packages.

The unfortunate result is that, according to various studies, "most students are not likelier to attend schools that spend more on instruction" (VIII).   So here we have an industry whose clients choose among thousands of possibilities without hard data about the quality of the core product, the education. Colleges have incentives to manipulate these millions of sitting ducks with confusing marketing and deceptive financial aid plans. More importantly, they do not have incentives to spend more money on education itself.  In the vacuum of quality data a default signal appears, “price, and in particular sticker price. The theory is schools that cost more will deliver a better education.” Here’s where a further perverse incentive appears.   “Schools have a real incentive to push up tuition for its own sake" (VI).  And they have responded to this incentive with extreme vigor: they raised tuition 297% between 1990 and 2012, or twice the increase seen in health care (I).  

We thus have opportunity for outrageous tuition increases.  What about motive? Well it turns out not to be the need of university administrators to coddle faculty with massive salary increases.  It turns out, according to Mr. Matthews, that the Baumol effect--in which services like instruction don’t see huge the productivity increases one finds in manufacturing, so labor costs always rise—isn’t really that important.  One proof is that only a small proportion of cost increases come from (generally low) increased instructional expenditures, so often targeted in MOOC discourse.  Another is that faculty salaries on the whole just don’t go up that much--  0.9% per year between 1987-2008 (V).

So why is the tuition too damn high? The first and largest immediate cause is administrative bloat.  Administration has grown far faster than any other segment of the university: one estimate is that it gets $2 for every $1 added to core educational functions (VI).  (This fits with studies of University of California expenditure growth.) The second immediate cause is the "amenities race" -- the famous climbing walls and Vegas-style sports complexes that seem to attract students with pretty good grades and truly outstanding family wealth (VIII).

But just as for Freud the psyche was not Ego or Superego alone, we must locate, Mr. Matthews assumes, an institutional Id behind the sheer relentlessness of rising prices. This was apparently best described by Harold Bowen  (not to be confused with William) as "the revenue theory of cost" (VI).  Core postulates are as follows: "there is virtually no limit to the amount of money an institution could spend for seemingly fruitful educational ends."  Each institution raises all it can.  Each institution "spends all it raises."

We have a theory of primal profligacy, and its most villainous instance is that genre known as the research university.  Their spending just goes up and up and up. While their poor relations at the community colleges raised tuition to make up for state funding cuts, public research universities increased overall revenue “by $5,793 per student, almost double the increase in per-student spending.” What this means, Mr. Matthews concludes, is that  “public research universities could have kept tuition stagnant and still had $2,651 more per student to work with, which could finance a good share of the actual spending increase. “  Why didn’t they do that and keep tuition down.  The reason is the Bowen Id: “they wanted more money than that, so they increased tuition too” (III).  Private research universities have an even worse unconscious urge, spending three times more per full time student than their public  cousins, or $12,435 during the past decade).

The tuition punch line is that administrative bloat and the amenities race are not root causes.  The root cause is the will to spend as much money as possible.  The title of this story is “just throwing money around and getting it from wherever" (III).  The tuition is too damn high because higher ed is compulsively spendthrift (except the community colleges, which are destitute.)  Plus, its managers are corrupt.  Although colleges should cut expenses to keep tuition down,  the "moral character of college and university administrators may be somewhat lacking, to put it politely." And so, our mild-mannered guide concludes, "universities could be spending far, far less than they are now without any corresponding decline in educational quality."

It is perhaps because colleges are wasteful and unreformable that the last two of the series’ segments are somewhat halfhearted. Tech innovations like MOOCs will eventually maybe be as good as college at "building human capital," but they won't ever signal "college" in the sense of subsidized fun, which is much of what state college funding really does (IX). So how to fix all this (X)? Who really knows.  Maybe make CCs free. Put other public colleges on a federal backstop when the states cut them. Perhaps try a super-voucher system with a cap on expenditures so that colleges would have a disincentive to raise fees.  And also, in a convergence with the Obama proposals that came out at the same time, force colleges to produce meaningful data on educational quality.  The series’ final line is an ominous call for better data, or else: "Without better data, there's no way to defend the contribution that college makes to our economy and our society, and no way to make that benefit cheaper for those who need it."

I retell the full Wonkblog story because it is a smart version of the dominant narrative that the university community must confront.  It embodies an important kind of liberal Reaganism.  The key premise is that government and public investment are basically good, but always opaque and perverse and in need of permanent austerity.  Public officials always want to spend way too much—that’s their Id at work—and in such an opaque way that even sympathetic wonks like Mr. Matthews can’t quite figure out what they spend the money on.  The associated practice is that audits replace the higher funding levels that built these public systems and once made them great.  A related practice is to minimize or ignore the effect of the history of previous cuts, so that behavior that is indeed suboptimal for the system, yet rational for the college, can never be understood.

That is really too bad in the case of higher education.  That is because the outsized growth in tuition via administrative bloat, hospital expenditures, Vegas gyms—every single category of non-instructional spending that so many academics constantly protest—had been driven by free-for-all competition for private funds.   If we poke our heads outside of this constrictive U.S. framework,  we can see that the huge costs and spending perversities are induced by administrators, it's true, while engaged in a free market scramble in the wake of repeated public cuts.

I have detailed much of this causality in this space before, in which I have been happy to criticize administrators for their complicity with this destructive system. But we need to see the whole system for what it is.   One can start on the technical errors in Mr. Matthews’ series via Dean Dad’s slam, "The Theory isToo Damn Thin,” and also think about a full-scale alternative via Bob Samuels’ new book, Why Public Higher Education Should be Free.  In my next post I will say more about why the tuition crisis won't get fixed without fixing public funding via this important piece by Mariam Wang at ProPublica, which I hope you have time to read.  


Posted by Chris Newfield | Comments: 5