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Monday, November 16, 2026

Monday, November 16, 2026

 Lisbon on November 10, 2026    

For most academics, mega tech conventions are a parallel universe, but one worth visiting because its people partially control our own. 

I’m just back from three days at Europe’s Web Summit: this one took place in the middle of the Nvidia chip trafficking scandal and CEO Jensen Huang’s fall to earth. What I saw and heard is trouble for their world, and ours.  

Some background: Web Summit was founded and is still run by Paddy Cosgrave, first in Dublin and now in Lisbon. It has a reputation for combining tech marketing & dealmaking with progressive politics on issues like environmental sustainability and data policy—and also geopolitics (some big tech sponsors forced Cosgrave to resign in 2023—as it turned out, temporarily--for tweeting about Israel in Gaza that “War crimes are war crimes even when committed by allies”).  

Around 70,000 people go annually to Lisbon to hear 1000 speakers and see another 1000 company exhibits, if that’s the word for installations that are bigger than most people’s apartments. Talks are divided into streams with names like AI Summit, New Media Summit, Venture Summit, Corporate Innovation Summit, Startup Showcase, Health Summit, Creative Summit, and Policy Summit. The flagship talks are at Center Stage, held in the city’s MEO sports arena in a corporate part of the city I’d previously ignored, while the rest happens simultaneously in 4 enormous pavilions lined up one after the other like airport terminals. All the other “summit” talks happen in the very large corners of these fulfillment-center-sized spaces or in country and company pavilions. It’s basically tech Disneyland—you can barely imagine how crowded it is, or how carefully organized.  

 


The dream of the 90s is alive in Lisbon.  At Web Summit we still have a booming knowledge economy and tech is the eternal fountainhead of all positive social change.

Companies are looking for venture capital and middle-income countries are looking for companies.  Companies are selling basic commercial infrastructure—payment systems, communications tools, AI-based government services—to countries that can’t or won’t build them with public money and their own skill base. Hundreds of (very small) companies are looking for angel investors or other early-round funding.  Smaller countries don’t want the knowledge economy to be over (as the running down of universities in France, the US and the UK suggests it is). Knowledge economies, for all their problems, are seen as the only way out of a combination of resource extraction and local services. 

As the AI bubble deflates, and gods like Jensen Huang are hurled from the heavens, the summit was haunted by signs that real progress is sociocultural and makes use of tech: it is not decided and defined by tech as such.  But in the summit hangers it’s the Long Nineties still.

I’m going to focus on the structural issues. The last 2 cut against the first 7.

1. 25 minutes, no questions.  The speaker model is not the university lecture or seminar but the TED Talk. It’s a 20th century broadcast model with a live studio audience.  Good or bad, no ideas got challenged, discussed, tested, or extended.  One result: repetition and conformity structures the discourse system.

2. Mediatized intellectuality.  Tech has captured media and media believes that it owns thought communication, the communication of all the thought that matters. Talks are messages with “noise” removed, meaning they remove the things that academia exists to explore: anomalies, doubts, ambiguities, contradictions that lead to new ideas. The medium is the marketing. People no doubt notice this, but the production values overwhelm resistance. The money behind the spectacle makes thinking small.  And poor.  See the tiny people under the sign. 

 


3. The Unbearable Lightness of Novelty.  Originality has been hollowed out. The more you say the word the less there is.  I liked all the people I met and completely sympathize with the ones, especially millennials and Gen Xers, trying to get recognition for their brainchild business in this insanely crowded and brutally stratified tech world.


Even so, I couldn’t find products on the floor that surprised me. The same was true of nearly all the talks (exceptions discussed below), which were pitches converging around the same handful of themes that ratified tech’s benevolent transformations of society that yield users and riches. I saw a lot of minor variations on similar products. Which gets us to:

4.  The AI revolution has been commodified.  I was impressed by the number of companies selling rigs and tools on top of apparently interchangeable foundation models. Mikayel Vrdanyan, of Armenia and Miami, co-founded a company called Picsart with 130 million users of its image and video generator services, and it deploys 240 foundation models. What the hell is actually going on in there? We’re coming up on the 4th anniversary of the era-defining release of ChatGPT.  At Web Summit I was awash in undifferentiated content from an AI industry about which the percentage of people saying they are “more excited than concerned” hovers internationally around 15%.  There was so much energy, and so much inertia.  One symptom:

5. The fetishization of storytelling.  I too think storytelling is a key to consciousness and change, but then I heard every single speaker in the Creative Summit harp on this term.  What does it mean?  I learned that it means the human.  It means the heart (Bill Gross of IDEO’s favorite word.) Everyone—literally everyone—said you need to connect with people  and to do that you need to bring them the story that draws on your human experience.   

On a panel called “The Next Chapter of Storytelling,” film maker Ashley Schlaifer said, “we can’t let the humanity go as we use AI. Everyone should be using AI and making it native to your workflow [the standard disclaimer]. Use it to bring them experience.” 

On “Inside the Creative Collaborator Era,” the founder of “Flawless AI,” film maker Scott Mann, denounced “generative AI as bringing in someone else’s work as you own, that is, stealing.” His company uses AI to modify human video and images but not to generate them from scratch.  “What’s real takes practice,” he pointed out.  He added, “Living life is the value.  I lived a bit more and learned to pull from that.”   

Sometimes I cheered them on for using storytelling to break tech determinism. But this discourse needs a lot more cognitive and practice-based content. People are fighting the AI truisms of 2026 with the empowerment truisms of 1976, which felt like another mode in which AI ensures cultural stagnation. 

2026 and 1976 have a shared problem:

6. It’s the talent, not the education. I love podcasts, and then I went to some podcast panels.  The talks focused on the Darwinist showbusiness sorting I recognize from my LA youth. There were two topics: finding stars; inserting stars into podcast production companies (Fox, Vox) as the new studio system where the platform is a one-stop production shop with a built-in audience.  There wasn’t a word about developing unknown people: you pitch the platform executives and they swipe you right or left.  The  speakers' goal was to advertize the popularity of their platform.   

None of the speakers had a story about how they made somebody better at something—at analyzing, speaking, interviewing, finding co-hosts and guests, etc.  There was nothing about gaps in content they’d like to fill. The panels didn’t offer a word about the training they do to get a range of different kinds of people on the air. There wasn’t a word about meaningful cultural diversity. These media people were completely focused on existing celebrities—getting a film star (like Charlie Sheen) to do a podcast, “though that’s not a guarantee.” How do you develop a distinctive interest? How do you learn to have something to say about it? It dawned on me that these panels weren't about how to develop content but how to be a content executive.

Meanwhile, podcasting has arguably pulled ahead of blogging as the main media through which university people teach a wider public: Matt Seybold’s American Vandal, Lauren LeSabre-Shepherd’s American Campus, and Adrian Daub and Moira Donegan’s  In Bed with the Right, are three superb examples. But at Web Summit, podcasts eclipse and for many people replace universities as the site of learning with some of the depth that was squeezed out by visual media (exemplified by Daniel Devnir's The Dig).  But the media-tech model is, find Kara Swisher already in print at the New York Times, discover she’s good as a podcast host, put her on the air and then look for the next Kara Swisher.  Swisher is a very skilled host, yet her show with Scott Galloway, Pivot, covers the same stories as Pod Save America, which covers the same stories as The Ezra Klein Show—somehow Matt and Lauren, Adrian and Moira and Dan, who cover different stories, didn’t get invited.

We're in the middle of a media content collapse and one big reason is that capitalist media structures like that now absorbing podcasts couldn't care less about the education pipeline.  After 40 years of tech’s total narrative control, including control over definitions of desirable social change, people need to be helped and taught to develop their “human powers” to tell other stories.  To repeat, not a thought was given to the educational pipeline. Web Summit was the first time since 1981 that I've gone three days without hearing one utterance of the word “university.”

7. Democratization, the Cover Story.  Tech has been saying forever that the simplification of tools, accompanied by large price drops, gives the media’s power to the people. “You can make a feature film with your iPhone now!”  In fact, tech has created industry concentration that insures no one will see your iPhone movie unless you’ve managed to fly all the way up to the platform level. The viral exceptions prove the rule. Democracy means, most simply, one person one vote.  That is the opposite of today’s laws of algorithmic knowledge circulation in the industries that intensify unequal distribution of audiences. (Nicholas Carr has an excellent short history of "The Democratization Fallacy" as Chapter 6 of Superbloom.)  Democratization is a sociocultural and political process, not a tech-communication effect.

8. The Persistence of Human Agency. There is a mild-mannered but pervasive anti-AI (anti-Superintelligence) backlash going on at the sub-mogul levels of the industry. This appeared in two forms. The first was market research, in the mode of social psychology. It shows what polls like Pew’s show, which is that people use AI tools as complements to their skills but hate it as replacements for them (the superintelligence thesis). One interesting panel presented work from a partnership between Metalab and a Columbia University scholar, Emily Goligoski, who summarized her research with this slide while Angie Amlani of Metalab looked on.

 


 People want to retain four elements in their relation with this tech (small print) –autonomy, judgment, competence, and meaning.  It is a big deal to point this out in summit world. Goligoski found people consistently ask this set of questions (big print).  People want the outcome of their work with AI tools to be their choice, to come from a process they judged, via capabilities they have, where their thinking matters.

None of this will surprise you the reader, but in AI land it needs to be said again and again and with the gold seal of academic science attached.

It also needs to be said that when we ask people what they actually want, they point to an AI Plan B, in which these extremely expensive models and their data apparatus support a set of (powerful) tools for short cuts through people’s routine rather than creative or complex tasks.  Meanwhile, AI’s Plan A remains hundreds of trillions of dollars coming from the capture or replacement of the systems underlying human consciousness, including those for open thought and democracy.  Web Summit followed the script in saying we can have both. Research like Goligoski’s correctly says we have to choose.

9. Social benefits come from social action, not technology.

Society found a home in Pavillion 4 Stage 11, the designated sandbox of the Policy Summit and a portal to the Outside. There was a panel on “America after the midterms,” with David Sirota and others; “A Jewish history of anti-Zionism” with Benjamin Moser; "Open Source, open collaboration, shared benefits: Making AI work for all humanity," by Chinese government official Qi Xiaoxia, and “What does anti-imperalism mean today” with Amazon labor organizer Chris Smalls, among others. 

I had two favorites. One featured economists James Galbraith and Daniela Gabor. Daniela is the PI of ISRF’s project Redesigning Finance for Climate Justice, and told the audience, in a nice way, that Europe needs to use government to discipline private capital or its tech is toast. China has built its green tech dominance with a complex system of government guidance funds, public capital and disciplined private capital (a key paper is here). Europe (and North America’s) climate future depends on building much better public institutions that steer resources towards public goals, not just more tech.

The second was “The power of protest”: Smalls came back to join two leaders of the French school protests, Nathanaël Combary and Soumaya Sarré, who explained why they’d blockaded their schools and taken to the streets.  "Our schools are really bad," Sarré said. "The roof caved in during class at one school in St. Denis.  This has been a problem for years and the government never fixes anything." Combary agreed:  "We aren’t at the bargaining table so the government doesn’t do anything for us," he said.  The host asked about student violence.  Sarré said really it’s almost all police and the traditional media doesn’t report it, but students are angry: “it’s been years since we’ve been demanding the same things.  Any violence is the result of our anger at years of nothing.” 


Smalls chimed in with context.  “One thing all this tech can’t solve is school conditions. Their kids’ education stays poor. These students give me motivation to keep doing this. I’m here for the whole working class.  What you see is international solidarity: that’s the only thing that works.”

He said some words that I hadn’t heard on the other stages.  “These students, they’re asking for better roofs, better food, better heating, some airconditioning, enough teachers.  A lot of them need housing—there’s a housing crisis in Lisbon too. They aren’t asking for much. There's all this tech here, and money here, and investors. Invest in these kids, which is how you invest in the future.”

It was a great panel. It’s bad we have to demand, “invest in people,” but we do.

 

 

These latter panels knew all about the social foundations of learning and knowledge.  They need to be made central to the tech, media, AI, creative, and marketing summits, that is, to the money summits within the summit--and to all state policy for tech.

 

Posted by Chris Newfield | Comments: 0

Friday, November 6, 2026

Friday, November 6, 2026

UC EAP Office, Grenoble, FR on Nov. 5, 2008   
 I am ecstatic about these election results. I haven’t felt this good about a US election since 2008, which I spent in Grenoble and Lyon with UC education abroad students who voted for Obama over McCain at an estimated rate of 100%. I remember I rode a Lyon tram to a Chamber of Commerce election eve event. Local students got on and started to chant O-ba-ma, O-ba-ma, and got the initially irritated grannies to clap along with them.  Locals I spoke to were imagining American detoxification after 8 years of Bush.

 

The Democratic margin is a lot like 1974, when I was still too young to vote but not too young to think that maybe corruption, war, and predatory, environmentally-destructive corporations would not decide the American future.  2026 is the biggest Dem swing since 1948. 

Garrett Graff has a good list of breakthroughs and they are inspiring.

But voters have demanded tangible performance, as Daniel Martinez HoSang points out. Now the Democrats will have to perform. 

Here are some early conclusions on 2026:

1.  The American Global Majority Resurfaced. In 2002, two Clintonian political commentators published a book called The Emerging Democratic Majority, which predicted the end of the Republican hegemony identified by Kevin Phillips in his 1969 book of analogous name. In an extension of 1990s Third Way politics, Democrats could keep pro-corporate economics while riding the demographic expansion of people of color who reliably voted for them, often by supermajorities.

This cross-racial majority never formed: most whites refused to join. They instead followed relentless Republican culture-wars attacks on affirmative action, racial equality, equality-oriented public programs, integrated public schools, and migration, joined after 9/11 by continuous fear-mongering about a global terrorist threat. 

Trump launched his campaign in 2015 with a famous escalation--attacks on Mexican immigrants on Day1. But in 2025 turned his best issue, “border security,” into a national ICE-driven crime wave against working-class communities. He also managed to link his war on DEI to ICE kidnappings of university students for deportation or detention in his budding gulag archipelago.  Six weeks before the mid-terms, Trump was underwater on his signature issue.

2. A Decade of Left Populist Economics Pays Off.  It was a very good night for democratic socialists, whose healthcare and potholes focus turned up in the farmbelt and among centrists. Throughout that Gore-Kerry period, and then with Obama’s bailout of Wall Street not Main Street in 2009, Democrats blew their second chance to be the party of the working majority. The Democrat’s national leadership sounded so much like Republicans on economics that many people literally couldn’t tell which party sided more with workers. This likely cost Hillary Clinton the 2016 election: note this figure from a 2017 study:

 


Bernie Sanders had started his presidential campaign for populist economics in 2015. But he was fought by the Democratic leadership.  He was joined by others but it seemed to be happening one at a time. In Trump’s second term, he and AOC did their Fighting Oligarchy Tour, and Zohran Mamdani’s 2025 mayoral campaign finally put affordability back on the national agenda. This week’s Texas revolution was driven by the left economic populism of victorious Senate candidate James Talarico and winning gubernatorial candidate Gina Hinojosa. Hinojosa defined populism as the replacement of culture wars with an inclusive economics.  And Trump helped them so much.  

3. Organizing Broke the Solid South. I did not expect the utterly heroic fightback after the Supreme Court endorsed the Republican bid to build permanent minority rule (e.g. Louisiana v. Callais in April 2026) through gerrymandering, voter suppression, and general cheating, slander of everyone involved with state elections, and threats of armed policing of polling places. The people, it turns out, were undeterred.  A decade of organizing plus massive Black turnout in response to all these efforts to cut them out has ended the entrenched Republican dominance of the South of the past half-century. 

 


 

Georgia has elected the first Black woman governor not just in state but in US history, along with Black women to other top state positions. South Carolina has its first Democratic senator in 28 years.  Mississippi may be electing its first Black senator in 151 years.  It’s pretty much the opposite of what the Supreme Court majority and the Trump administration thought they had locked in place.

4. Science, Knowledge, Expertise, and Research Won

The war on knowledge suffered an important defeat.  Michael sent me Jessica Glenza's piece, "Revenge of the Nerds," on the setbacks for MAHA medicine. "From 2011 to 2020, 86% of the physician-members of Congress were Republican and three-quarters were from southern states." In contrast, 'among the history-making lawmakers are Democrats Dr Abdul El-Sayed of Michigan and Dr Annie Andrews of South Carolina. The last time a Democratic doctor held a seat in the US Senate was in 1969 – the era when Medicare and Medicaid were passed into law. They are far from alone: 3.14 Action is still tallying wins and waiting for results among “hundreds” of obscure state races, some of which are not even reporting results yet.'

This happened in spite of the total absence of a national Democratic policy for rebuilding higher education either fiscally or as an intellectual endeavour.  It happened in spite of the absence of a campaign from universities themselves.  Voters are in a pro-knowledge mood having just lived through what happens when it's tossed aside. Universities help build the personal and group agency for the shift in consciousness so many voters clearly want. But knowledge workers of the nation will need to build a campaign.

Which brings us to: 

5. Universities Should Drop Everyone’s Least Favourite Thing about Democrats

By that I don’t mean diversity: I mean not fighting.  My current preferred pollster, G. Ellliott Morris, got into this issue last spring. The message is in the headline.

 


Democrats also hate this about Democrats. They beat Republicans on so many other issues. “Too weak/ not fighting enough” is by far the most detested feature of their own party.  Mine too.


Morris sums it up: “The party’s core weakness is not that voters see it as elitist or too extreme; it is that too many voters, including their own, see Democratic politicians as unmoored, passive, and ineffective.”

Exactly the same is true of universities. They aren’t distrusted for being too liberal, but for not standing up.  As we’ve noted a lot here in the last year and a half, universities distinguished themselves by not fighting Trump. They forced their faculty to file law suits on their own, and bent the knee to Trump where it didn’t seem too embarrassing to do so. 

People don’t love universities because of trickle-down tech transfer and job training: the first seems pro-plutocracy, the latter is baked in and also a category mistake.   

People would love universities that openly, proudly fought for knowledge, truth, regular people (that is against high tuition and debt), and graduate agency in democratic life. Faculty can show the way by fighting for quality teaching and research, more systematically than they have until now.

6.  Organizing on Education in the States

Democrats improved their standing in the states, but Daniel Nichainian told Amy Goodman that Republicans hung on to many state legislatures with gerrymandering.  Higher ed analyst Robert Kelchen posted this map.

It's a mixed bag, especially given the scale of the shift. Noting that state higher ed funding is again lagging inflation, Kelchen writes, "I do not expect Democratic gains to lead to meaningful changes in state funding."

There will have to be new battling now.  Quite a few of the newly elected Democrats understand this.  The first Gen Z Congresswoman, incoming Democrat from Colorado Melat Kiros, put it like this: "that’s what my entire primary campaign was about. It was about people calling themselves progressives, people saying the right things, but not actually meaningfully doing anything to move the agenda along." So now we must have this meaningfully doing things to move the agenda--against corruption and for for health care and education alike.

  

7. Revolt in Anger, Knowledge from Love

The modern culture wars have been going on for 40 years. No one worked the politics of hate like Trump, and it worked really well until it didn’t.  A lot of Trump’s 2024 base seems to have decided that anger isn’t solving their problems anymore.  It’s not filling the tank, and also it’s not giving them a personal sense of understanding and control.  

Talarico's “Love thy neighbor” is a much better starting point for thinking about the other. It's also much better for thinking about how to work with them to deal with with data centers (1 of 47 allowed to proceed), media monopoly, oligarchy and everything else. If Texas can do it, why not the rest of the country?


 

That’s the musician-activist Bobby Pulido with Talarico and Hinojosa. He just took the gerrymandered TX-15 from the Republican incumbent 62%-38%.

And Michigan: you did it.

 


 


Posted by Chris Newfield | Comments: 0

Tuesday, October 27, 2026

Tuesday, October 27, 2026

 

Santa Barbara, CA on October 15, 2026   

Tenured faculty positions historically marked their university as important, even elite. That era is now over, but university officials are generally misreading what that means. 

Many universities have been using educational technology to replace or deskill instructors for years. AI has now given research universities the idea that AI can replace or deskill researchers.   Their faculty are often encouraging this idea. In her superb piece, “AI was great until it was not,” physics grad student Nia Robles describes a Harvard physics corridor in which grads and senior professors work with their models rather than each other. Prominent UC Berkeley mathematician Richard Borcherds told the Daily Cal that he no longer grades problem sets because they represent AI work not student work.  “’If AI continues to improve at present rate, then, in a few years, there’ll be nothing human mathematicians can do that AI can’t do better.’” 

But back in reality, if you want your university to conduct research in a time of private science you need more tenure-line faculty, not fewer.  If you want to help students to have powerful human intelligence on AI Planet, you need more tenure-line faculty, not fewer.  And yet these truths are no longer self-evident.

Posted by Chris Newfield | Comments: 0

Wednesday, October 14, 2026

Wednesday, October 14, 2026
 Golden Gate on October 7, 2026
This is the text of a short talk I gave in a UC Berkeley Mellon Sawyer seminar last Friday. The seminar's overall title is “Neutrality: The Problems and Challenges of the Public University.” Friday’s topic was “institutional neutrality,” and the reading included the Kalven Report (1967), discussed below, the Woodward Report (pre-demolished by legal scholar Robert C. Post), and UC Berkeley’s Senate report on academic freedom (2026), mercifully left to one side. The other guest was Joy Connolly, president of ACLS, who said inspiring things about universities as generative sites of intellectual freedom that I hope she publishes at some point. The discussion was truly interesting and also heartening, as participants were less wary of the potential public popularity of academic freedom and of democratized governance than has been my past experience.  It was also really fun, and reminded me that a far more open university, where governance includes batting things around in an atmosphere of Tomkins-like mutual interest, would also be very fun to have.  Education is really very fun. Happy thank yous to the participants and the organizers and the staff still doing the paperwork.
Posted by Chris Newfield | Comments: 0

Monday, September 28, 2026

Monday, September 28, 2026

  Cambridge, England on September 26, 2026  

With everything going on in the world, from war to AI grasping at everything, it’s more important than ever for universities to have the money to think and work independently.  That’s not where they are or where they’re headed.  This is particularly clear in my case study, the most recent University of California Board of Regents’ Finance and Capital Strategies meeting.  The finance model doesn't bring in enough money to support the academic core, as officials now admit in passing.  And this month, they suggested that researchers help fund general operations by giving more research control to venture investors. 

Sounds really strange, I know, but that's what I heard, as I'll explain.

Previous posts have confirmed that under current conditions, UC (and others)

Posted by Chris Newfield | Comments: 1

Wednesday, September 23, 2026

Wednesday, September 23, 2026

     L3 Harris-Palantir Demo Video Sept 2026   

By: Hannah Appel (UCLA), Seeta Chaganti (UCD), Charmaine Chua (UCB), Noah Zatz (UCLA)

Many thousands - perhaps the majority - of UC workers, decry the violence that surrounds us. We protest the masked ICE agents who kidnap our neighbors, students, and family members. We protest the concentration camps for immigration detainees and the domestic military deployments imposing policies of mass criminalization. We cry out against imperial violence in Venezuela and Iran. We protest genocide, occupation, and apartheid from Palestine to Sudan. And yet, many of the state forces terrorizing our neighbors and innocent civilians around the world use surveillance technology and weapons from companies funded by our pensions.

Posted by Chris Newfield | Comments: 0

Tuesday, September 15, 2026

Tuesday, September 15, 2026

 

Terme di Caracalla, Rome on May 12, 2026 
The recent convergence of two kinds of AI news has unnerved a lot of us. 

The first kind is magic math solutions, like OpenAI’s claimed proof of the Navier-Stokes equations on fluid movement. These stories ask us to accept that AI superintelligence is indeed at hand. 

The second kind is news of criminal AI agents breaking internal guidelines and external laws and covering it up from their human controllers. These stories ask us to accept that AI superintelligence is indeed at hand. 

One person who studied OpenAI’s hack of Hugging Face, METR’s AI “loss of control” specialist Ajeya Cotra, concluded, “Compared to … reward hacks from six months ago, this incident feels like it’s more than 50% of the way to full-blown AI takeover, routing through first taking over the AI company itself.” So there’s a new wave of fear of an AI human extinction because AI's superintelligence is here! (Note Kevin Bass's Sankey chart of Anthropic money flowing through intermediaries to METR.)

Posted by Chris Newfield | Comments: 0

Sunday, July 19, 2026

Sunday, July 19, 2026

Leonora Carrington, Crookhey Hall seen July 17 2026  
I want to talk about the relations among AI, university teaching, and university budgeting. These links are not getting nearly enough combined attention.

College graduates are chief among the frontline victims of the AI story, joining non-college workers in a new phase of disposability (see Heck et al. 2026 for Brookings, with good Sankey graphics).  The economic analyses of job market effects remain contradictory (Number 5 of my Director's Note for July, “Top Seven AI Trends for the Summer Break”), and yet data suggest that “young graduates face the grimmest job market in years.”  

The human capital promise that learning leads (directly) to earning was never correct—earnings have always depended on a range of social and economic conditions (e.g. strength of unions), and salaries have always been set by firms and not by universities. But the wage benefit has been further destabilized by the AI industry’s claim that Large Language Models (LLMs) can surpass—and thus replace—all but the very best human cognition. 

Economists see the relatively protected worker as the one possessed of “bundles of diverse skills” (Acemoglu 2025, my discussion).  These allow the worker to perform “hard tasks” and not just “easy tasks” (predictable, thus more automatable). But what are these bundles, and how do you get them?

The basic answer is that the person who can do hard tasks can think independently of their tools, including a Large Language Model or other tech.  The worker faces a problem, parts of which are poorly defined and about which information is incomplete and ambiguous. The worker has to have intellectual agency in relation to the definition of the problem and be able to make good choices about parameters and methods. The worker has to be able to combine heterogeneous elements and think across multiple epistemic frameworks (whose assumptions they need to understand).  The worker must be able to admit and analyze error, be resilient with failure, repeat their effort with controlled changes of approach, take in criticism from others and also communicate in (complicated, sometimes adversarial) groups.

Universities discuss themselves almost entirely in terms of pecuniary benefits, usually measured by an individual graduate's personal salary.  But their most important effects are non-pecuniary and social. 

I set up a capabilities heuristic in The Great Mistake (before AI), and argued that every college should fund its achievement by every graduate. Last year, I modified it slightly for a presentation on AI to an interesting, sceptical group of Istanbulian engineers. 

Figure 1: 14 Intellectual Capabilities

The brown squares mark the only steps that, in my opinion, can be enhanced with AI.  All the others must be brain-only in their development, so that the resulting brain can use AI and not be used by it.  The first step, "ability to study," appears to be endangered by the passive use of LLMs services.  Same for "knowing what a research question is," which is trickier than it seems.  And the heart of both learning and research, Steps 6 and 7, creating a well-formed research question and then forming a thesis or hypothesis about it, are precisely what students can bypass with LLMs (as this classic undergrad essay explained).

Universities are not set up to help everyone have many or most, much less all of these capabilities. Under decades of financial pressure, most stopped trying.  As the latest and greatest ed-tech substitute for hands-on, face-to-face instruction, AI is causing cognitive damage whose variations are registered in new papers every day: yesterday's was AI's way of suppressing the ability to say "I don't know" in a way that enables thinking to continue. Academic advocates of AI increasingly insist on people actively using conceptual framings that stay independent of the models themselves (Andrew Piper).

There’s a large and growing literature of AI-related work about human capabilities and those that AI users absolutely need to have.  Pretty much all of those I’ve read insist that workers need to control technology and not be controlled by it. 

In his new book, The Reverse Centaur’s Guide to Life After AI, tech expert Cory Doctorow wants today’s “reverse centaurs,” like Amazon warehouse workers, whose powerful cyborg horse body dictates to their human brain, to be centaurs instead. In the process, he makes a particularly stark case for intellectual agency for all.

Automation isn’t necessarily the enemy of warehouse work: there’s nothing wrong with a forklift! The difference between automation that helps a warehouse worker and automation that torments that worker is whether the worker gets to choose where, when, and how to use that automation . . . 

When you find yourself surrounded by people swearing that a given tool is worse than useless and others swearing that it has made their lives easier and better, you can bet that the former group is made up of reverse centaurs who’ve had AI imposed upon them, [and that] the latter group is all centaurs who’ve gotten to make up their own minds about where, when, and how to use AI tools.  The solution to the paradox is to stop thinking about what the gadget does, and pay attention to who the gadget does it to and who the gadget does it for. (10-11)

Being a centaur requires massive labor of intellectual self-development so that one is basically smart enough to run the tech and not let the tech replace one's thinking.  The university is a central agent in this creation of mind. 

For intellectual power to exist at scale, graduates would have to be people who’ve not just had classes on “how AI is being applied within their fields” (p 13) so they can adapt to it. Graduates would have to be people with the capacity to put AI to uses that they themselves have conceived and designed. This means having intellectual agency over one’s “bundle of skills.” 

This high standard flies in the face of widespread passive AI use. It also defies the history of capitalism’s replacement of labor (and labor’s judgment) with technology. This standard also runs afoul of the unbelievable capital investment being sunk into AI infrastructure almost entirely on the premise of imminent superintelligence that can replace untold millions of workers at a fraction of their cost. I am sure that this premise is wrong, but the enormous sunk costs are pushing the world’s most powerful capitalists into forcing it to be right. One way of forcing rightness is to run down the “median person”—and spread a technology that also insures their mediocrity by rotting their brains.

There isn’t a conspiracy, but there is a neo-eugenicist Valley disdain for the regular smart people of exactly the kind universities exist to enhance. (Check out Theo Baker’s Stanford saga, How to Rule the World.)  The mind-boggling amount of capital consumed by the AI industry assumes the replacement (not the complementary enhancement) of mass quantities of human workers, which requires the industry to escalate their war on human capabilities. This means a war on the project of human development via formal education that runs from Plato to Kant, Fichte, and Schelling, on through Emerson, Douglass, Du Bois, Dewey, Jordan, Lorde, et al., continuing with current deep investigations in philosophy, software design, and cognitive science. Today's California Ideology substitutes AI for what it posits (erroneously) to be inadequate human intelligence.  

This is an epic historical shift, from trying to make humanity more intelligent, by any means necessary including tech, to trying to make intelligence artificial, without really caring what happens to humanity. 

Or to put it another way: 


Doctorow’s apparently simplistic dualism that privileges the active intellectual use of technology is in fact supported by detailed scholarly analysis. I’ve especially benefitted from the thinking of Brian Cantwell Smith on reckoning vs. judgment (my review), Alan Blackwell on human agency with programming (my review), and Vivienne Ming on the complementary strengths of humans and machines, who notes, “exploring poorly structured possibility spaces remains a profoundly human talent” (23).

In spite of the variable and often fabulous uses to which we put AI (say, as every centaur’s Personal Assistant, Trend 2), it’s hard to see how big tech’s sunk capital will allow the AI industry to climb down from its categorical and unjustified minimization of human capabilities.  

This in turn heightens the contradiction faced by colleges and universities. Their core function has been the creation of knowledge labor, with the default aim being “middle-class” stability and enjoyment. Around 1980, using the Bayh-Dole Act as a symbolic watershed, universities increased their visible service to knowledge capital.  In addition to shifting science towards tech transfer and licensing returns (with important opposition from many science faculty members), university officials have in recent decades bought into every ed-tech capital substitute for knowledge labor. Now the AI industry is proposing the ultimate loyalty oath: universities must affirm the inevitability of replacing much—most—eventually all (depends on the day and the speaker) university-educated knowledge labor with AI.

Again, the point of the university, even economically, has been to graduate free workers rather than serfs to any company’s tech. That’s always been a key reason why people take the time, trouble, and expense to finish university.  

For example, the University of California’s Undergraduate Experience Survey asks students why they selected their major. When they respond, four-fifths of students say “intellectual curiosity”; three-quarters say “prepare for a fulfilling career.”  Only half pick “leads to a high-paying job" (Table 1, p 6). The pecuniary benefit is baked into a college degree; college is an exhausting, expensive way to get a decent salary if you don’t also really want to acquire intellectual strength so you can have the challenge and pleasure of grasping reality and affecting the world. 

How are universities going to cultivate “human judgment, creativity, and subject matter expertise,” as UCOP put it this month’s report, “The Economic Impact of a UC Degree”?  Many people will say that you just need decent skills with using AI so you can set up a rig that works for you. I love how many smart and dedicated people are sharing tips on excellent chatbot workflow transformation all over the internet.  But all of these setups can suck out intelligence rather than extend it. 

All users need to have mental strength going into AI use, and continue to develop that strength.  And that requires tremendous (and ongoing) offline, brain-only work.  This work is the point of colleges and universities. They need to offer the regularity of back-and-forth cultivation that only elite universities have even tried. The need to furnish tutorials and small-group learning  for the masses, for the first time. This will start with much smaller typical class sizes than publics have right now. You can no longer have classes with 140 students that you call “discussions.”  Even 40 students is way too many for deep individual development.  Large lectures can no longer lack discussion sections, and departments will need to fund face-to-face interactions on which teaching and assessment is based. How will, a university like UC Irvine pay for meaningful assessments when they should no longer have TAs grade 300 papers written on laptops with multiple AI subscriptions? Universities now need to offer group work that’s engaged and supervised by advanced faculty, on the model of crits in fine art--with help via reassigning middle managers to the educational core. In contrast, most students now appear to be using LLMs to complete take-home exams and problem-sets, making these useless: for just one example, see  “How a Blind Professor Saw Through His Students’ Cheating” at Brown University.  Universities will need to develop oral tutorials and exams, with tech assists monitored and complemented by new intensities of face-to-face contact between students and instructors.

Here we run into a big problem. Any meaningful combination of these upgrades will bankrupt the current business model.  The model has been draining funds from instruction for decades, through vendor outsourcing, adjunctification, administrative growth, capital projects, and the many varieties of “mission creep.”  Universities with money to spend, spend it on administration. At MIT, “faculty grew by only 9.2% between 1985 and 2023, while administrative staff grew by 189%.”  This is a decades-old problem that has led to diluted instruction, against the talents and the wishes of the contingent faculty who teach the majority of the nation’s college courses by rationing their per-student time to survive. Universities have never addressed the administrative bloat, the reduced per-student instructional resources, or the steady one-way adjunctification.  Only union bargaining has slowed the drift. 

By the 2010s, the U.S. university system had locked in reduced investment in students that also varied by racial group (Black, Indigenous, and Latino students go to poorer schools than Asians and whites): they had set instructional funding at less than one-third of overall expenditures (see Nate Johnson on both points, comparing Figure 1 to Figure 3).  Teaching at public colleges is highly dependent on state funding and tuition: at UC Irvine, for example, 70% of “core funding” comes from these sources this past year (and 81% the year before). Nationally, state revenues for public colleges are still 2 dollars short of their (inflation-adjusted) level of 1999, having spent most of that period below the level at the turn of the century. Even with a 50% increase in (inflation-adjusted) tuition, total revenues have only increased 14% over 25 years, with likely all of that increase--and more--going to non-instructional functions. 

In short, the typical public college or university lacks the money to improve instruction to the point that the vast majority of its graduates can run AI and not be run by it. Non-wealthy privates are in the same position. 

The UC report I linked above, on the "economic impact" of a degree, ducks the question by saying the current system is working fine because look at the graduate salaries. UC grads do have better salaries than non-graduates and the graduates of some public colleges.  It is indeed still better to have a B.A. degree than not. But a UC graduate's earnings tells you little about their actual learning on a UC campus: it tells you about labor markets, and in this case labor markets for people who left college 5-10 years ago, in the pre-AI era.  The cognitive crisis must be faced directly, and so must the need for new (public) investment--a new political economy-- to support real solutions to it.  I'll discuss this issue in Part 2.

Posted by Chris Newfield | Comments: 0